just_n_examiner ([info]just_n_examiner) wrote,
@ 2008-10-22 23:22:00
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A Lack of Definiteness
Do you think that too many patents issue with claims that are not sufficiently clear?

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Well, the CAFC seems to think so; in January of this year, in the Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 USPQ2d 1663 (Fed. Cir. 2008) decision, they said:

"When a claim limitation is defined in purely functional terms, the task of determining whether that limitation is sufficiently definite is a difficult one that is highly dependent on context (e.g., the disclosure in the specification and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art area). We note that the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation."

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The PTO might think so, too. They issued a couple of memos to examiners on September 2nd in response to the CAFC decision.

[I assume that these memos are on the USPTO web site, but I couldn't find them.]

The memos are "a clarification regarding indefiniteness rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112 second paragraph". They are designed to "remind the examining corps of the appropriate use of indefiniteness rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph", both in general and when examining means-plus-function claims.

They address, among other things, rejections when a claim term lacks a clear and precise definition, and when a claim limitation lacks proper antecedent basis.

The memos really only restate the MPEP's guidance on 112 second, but they do indeed serve as reminders to examiners of the importance of making sure claims are sufficiently definite.

---

James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer also think too many indefinite patents are issued. In their book, Patent Failure, they argue that the root of the current problems with the patent system can be traced to a lack of notice, and that in particular the very nature of software and business method patents makes them inherently less definite, relative to other types of patents.

The notice function, of course, is supposed to inform the public as to the scope of patent protection. It ideally allows the public to discern the boundaries of what has been patented, so that they can avoid infringing, in the same way that a fence allows one to discern the boundaries of private property and so can easily avoid trespassing. The authors' point is that it is the lack of those clear boundaries of intellectual property that causes problems.

A bit of their analysis:

Features that affect the notice function of patents include:

  • Fuzzy or unpredictable boundaries (because there is no reliable way of determining patent boundaries short of litigation).

  • Public access to boundary information (because it is possible for patent owners to hide the claim language that defines patent boundaries from public view for many years).

  • Possession and the scope of rights (because courts sometimes grant patent owners rights to technology that is new, different, and distant from anything they actually made or possessed).

  • The patent flood (because investments in new technology often need to be checked against many patents - even thousands, in the case of e-commerce).

So, what can be done about it? They suggest (among other things):

  • Reform the process of generating claims and litigating infringement by having the CAFC show more deference to the claim construction of the USPTO and the district courts.

  • Implement a single specialized federal trial court to handle all patent lawsuits.

  • Have examiners ask for more information about the meaning of claims and reject vague and abstract claims more aggressively.

  • Allow the USPTO to offer opinion letters addressing whether a particular technology infringes a U.S. Patent, and have the courts give those opinion letters some deference.

  • Require the USPTO to not only make pre-grant publication mandatory, but to require publication of every new or amended claim in every patent.

  • Treat software as an "unpredictable" technology, thus limiting claims more closely to the technology actually disclosed.
    [This, of course, leaves aside the problem of setting guidelines for what constitutes a 'software patent'.]

  • Increase filing and renewal fees to decrease the number of patent applications filed and maintained in force.

  • Strengthen obviousness standards.

  • Reform patent law by simply excusing good-faith infringers, or expand the current prior-user defense to cover all computer and electronics inventions.

---

The authors really do make some pretty compelling arguments, at least to somebody with some one-sided knowledge of patent prosecution, but pretty much no first hand knowledge of patent litigation. I'm kind of surprised that I haven't seen more buzz about this book, but maybe I haven't been looking in the right places, and admittedly, I had this book sitting on my bookshelf for a few months before I got around to reading it.


I can appreciate their arguments regarding the difficulties of interpreting claim scope. It is not uncommon to examine applications that are written in a way that requires a fair bit of deciphering in order to get a good understanding of what the inventor is trying to patent.

And that's just the American inventors; foreign inventors are often far worse, because of the common practice of running a machine translation on a foreign language specification and submitting it to the Office as is. I hate picking up a new application which claims foreign priority, because I know that there is a good chance that I'm going to have to spend an inordinate amount of time just to figure out what the heck is going on.

In a perfect world, all the specifications would be crystal clear, and all the claims definite and enabled (and patentable, of course; lots of counts that way).

In our world, though, well, there is always the 112 rejection...


(Post a new comment)


(Anonymous)
2008-10-23 02:03 pm UTC (link)
Some thoughts regarding the individual suggestions.

"Reform the process of generating claims and litigating infringement by having the CAFC show more deference to the claim construction of the USPTO and the district courts."

Interesting -- claim construction (in the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms in the specification) is based upon the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art. Unless the USPTO starts hiring experts that can opine to the meaning of those of ordinary skill in the art, the USPTO is not a good place to start – particularly when a great many examiners are not familiar with case law.

As for deference to the district courts, this seems at odds with the next suggestion.

"Implement a single specialized federal trial court to handle all patent lawsuits."

Even a blind squirrel can find a nut sometime.

"Have examiners ask for more information about the meaning of claims and reject vague and abstract claims more aggressively."

The standard for indefiniteness is pretty low. "Only when a claim remains insolubly ambiguous without a discernible meaning after all reasonable attempts at construction must a court declare it indefinite." Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings. Ambiguous terminology is a function of the ambiguity found in language and is an inherent problem with all legal documents. This reminds me of the famous chicken case that is taught in most law school contract classes. For you non-lawyers out there, let me ask this – "is the term 'chicken' indefinite?"
http://everything2.com/e2node/The%2520Chicken%2520Case

Simply put, language is imperfect

"Allow the USPTO to offer opinion letters addressing whether a particular technology infringes a U.S. Patent, and have the courts give those opinion letters some deference."

Who is going to make the determination? A non-attorney examiner? One of the USPTO's legal staff? I bet the USPTO would loooove this suggestion – as if they didn't already have enough on their plate.

"Require the USPTO to not only make pre-grant publication mandatory, but to require publication of every new or amended claim in every patent."

Another great suggestion that the USPTO is going to love. However, now that I'm thinking of it, it really shows the ignorance of the writers of this book. Once a patent application has been published the first time, it is accessible via public pair so any amendments to the claims are publicly accessible. They would not necessarily be searchable, but they are accessible.

"Treat software as an "unpredictable" technology, thus limiting claims more closely to the technology actually disclosed.[This, of course, leaves aside the problem of setting guidelines for what constitutes a 'software patent'.]"
Good question, what is a software patent? Also, why is it "unpredictable?" It is no more unpredictable than biotech, semiconductor, or golf teaching aids.

"Increase filing and renewal fees to decrease the number of patent applications filed and maintained in force."

The anti-patent philosophy of these writers are now showing through more brightly. Also – it has nothing to do with indefiniteness.

"Strengthen obviousness standards."

See above.

"Reform patent law by simply excusing good-faith infringers, or expand the current prior-user defense to cover all computer and electronics inventions."

The exception that swallowed the rule. The first defense of every infringer will be "we were acting in good faith." As such, patents will no longer be enforceable from the time that eventually-allowed claims were first published or when the applications issues. Instead, patents will be enforceable only from the time the infringer receives the cease and desist letter.

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Broadest Reasonable Construction...
(Anonymous)
2008-10-23 06:32 pm UTC (link)
(sorry this is anonymous - it won't let me just type in my name...

Just a note on this from the post and the comment:

"'Reform the process of generating claims and litigating infringement by having the CAFC show more deference to the claim construction of the USPTO and the district courts.'

Interesting -- claim construction (in the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms in the specification) is based upon the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art. Unless the USPTO starts hiring experts that can opine to the meaning of those of ordinary skill in the art, the USPTO is not a good place to start – particularly when a great many examiners are not familiar with case law."


First, I am not an examiner, but I have to think that most examiners have ordinary skill in whatever art they are examining. They certainly have some understanding of the meaning of the terms or they couldn't do their job. The notion of getting an expert seems unrealistic.

Second, that said, there is no way that courts in litigation can give deference to examiner construction, because examiners don't use the ordinary meaning rule. They use the broadest reasonable construction (which can be broader than ordinary meaning, and often is). Perhaps this is what the last commenter was getting at. I explore this particular problem with claim definiteness in my article "The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution" http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=931543

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Re: Broadest Reasonable Construction...
(Anonymous)
2008-10-23 09:10 pm UTC (link)
Original poster

Contrary to popular belief, in most instances, neither examiners (nor patent attorneys) are one having ordinary skill in the art. We may have the same training (e.g., EE, ChemE, ME, etc.) as one skilled in the art, but to have ordinary skill, IMHO, one should have also practiced in the art. Engineering/law/business/medicine/etc. in theory is much different than it is in practice. As part of this, words/expressions that may have a particular meaning in practice may mean something else to somebody who only looks in from the sidelines.

Again, this doesn't mean that an examiner/attorney cannot be a PHOSITA. It just means that it shouldn't be counted on.

The concept of "broadest reasonable construction" can be taken in different directions. From where I sit, examiners are good at giving a broadest construction, but a "reasonable" construction is altogether different. The following language is found in MPEP 2111: The broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims must also be consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art would reach. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359, 49 USPQ2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Also, as stated in MPEP 2111.01, claims are to be given their plain meaning, which refers to the ordinary and customary meaning, which is "the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention." Again, we get back to the PHOSITA.

Anyway, writing perfectly clear claims is difficult because we are dealing with an imperfect medium (i.e., the English language). No matter how clearly one tries to draw the line during prosecution, once a patent gets litigated, the patent holder will try to expand the language to encompass the alleged infringers product, and the alleged infringer will attempt to reduce the scope of the claim (actually, this could happen in reverse if an overly-broad construction leads to invalidation of the claim due to prior art). This is the nature of the legal system.

(Reply to this) (Parent)

more detail is always appreciated
(Anonymous)
2008-10-23 07:47 pm UTC (link)
I am an examiner.

Anyways a buddy of mine works for Intel and one of his patents just issued. He found the claims and spec completely incomprehensible, and he was the one who provided the documents which were the foundation of the specification.

Its a sad state if the inventor can't even understand what they are getting protection for, nor how to make or use the invention based off of what was published. I understand why this happens, but the patent process is a two way street and it is no good if the public in terms of the PHOSITA (i need to use that acronym in my rejections) can not improve upon that invention because they can't understand it to begin with.

As an examiner, I always appreciate more detail in the specification. I like the requirements in accelerated examination which require mapping out where each claim element is found in the spec. It makes it very easy to understand what the invention actually is and would seem to me to less likely result in an overly broad read of the claims.

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(Anonymous)
2008-10-25 04:22 pm UTC (link)
The problem of indefinite claims is most acute when it relates to the point of novelty, as is often the case. Too many times, claims issue based on certain language being in the claims or having been added to the claims, but there is no explanation what that language means.

Sometimes this is cleared up by the Examiner explaining what she thinks the claims means in a notice of allowance. However, a patentee will often dispute that interpretation if it gets litigated.

What if patent examiners issued more Section 112 indefiniteness rejections after the point of novelty was established? The rejection could be maintained until the patentee explained on the record the boundaries of the claim language.

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(Anonymous)
2008-10-25 06:51 pm UTC (link)
"Sometimes this is cleared up by the Examiner explaining what she thinks the claims means in a notice of allowance."

The notice of allowance is way too late. Each rejection should begin with a statement of how the claim is being interpreted. If a claim permits more than one interpretation, it is often possible to do a prior art rejection on one interpretation and a scope of enablement rejection on the other. In that situation, it can be easy to arrive at definite language.

"What if patent examiners issued more Section 112 indefiniteness rejections after the point of novelty was established?" I don't see how this could work. How do you conclude that something is novel, and then argue that you don't understand what it is?

On another matter, do any other examiners out there feel that they are being discouraged from making 112(2) rejections? The guidelines and memos all say something like, "this does not mean that examiners should not make 112(2) rejections", but the emphasis is always on how 112(2) is being improperly applied. I know from experience that the surest way to draw unwanted attention, especially in a signatory program, is to make a 112(2) rejection. It is not safe even when the fact pattern squarely fits a form paragraph.

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(Anonymous)
2008-10-25 07:27 pm UTC (link)
do any other examiners out there feel that they are being discouraged from making 112(2) rejections?

Yes.

SPEs obviously don't pay attention to the guidelines because I got hit on the sig program for making objections to antecedent basis issues instead of 112 senconds even though the claim language was clear. It was just a case of saying "the widget" instead of "a widget".

SPEs are useless.

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(Anonymous)
2008-10-28 06:41 pm UTC (link)
Actually, we had been trained in the academy to only use a 112 rejection unless we had no idea what the claim meant, and to just object to stuff like antecedent basis issues.... unless the issues were so severe that it was impossible to tell what was what.

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refuse to acknowledge the existance of indefiniteness
(Anonymous)
2008-10-28 07:46 pm UTC (link)
Yeah, just do what you were "trained" to do without bothering to read the laws 'n MPEP 'n stuff. Also, I have never understood the point of making a claim objection, for which there is no obligation to correct. Either the situation is non-compliant and warrants a rejection or you are merely functioning as a well compensated apple-polisher

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Re: refuse to acknowledge the existance of indefiniteness
(Anonymous)
2008-11-03 10:21 pm UTC (link)
I don't know why the training academy is now teaching new examiners to use objections where a rejection is proper... Of course, the "clarification memo" that went out recently doesn't help matters by seemingly discouraging the use of 112 rejections in all but the most egregious cases.

As for myself, I will always reject under 112 second if a claim element lacks antecedent basis, even if I know what the applicant "meant." It seems pedantic at first glance, but just because I know what the applicant meant by "the widget" in dependent claim 2 when neither claims 1 nor 2 defined "a widget," doesn't mean a jury of laypersons will know what "the widget" is or where "the widget" goes...

The only issue I take with the post right above this one is that "there is no obligation to correct" a claim objection. You're not going to get a notice of allowance so long as an objection remains on the record. I'd call that an "obligation to correct." If I were the person deciding the petition on a claim objection that should have been a rejection, however, I'd grant the petition overturning the objection, and instruct the examiner to make the proper rejection (for no count). Objections are not intended to keep a statutory matter out of the courts by calling it an administrative matter.

-MM

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(Deleted post)
Re: refuse to acknowledge the existance of indefiniteness
(Anonymous)
2008-11-04 10:30 pm UTC (link)
JD, if the examiner refuses to withdraw his improper objection, don't you have to petition to force the withdrawal?

And, of course, I would encourage the use of proper 112 2nd rejections, not even more improper ones...

-MM

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(Deleted post)
Re: refuse to acknowledge the existance of indefiniteness
(Anonymous)
2008-11-10 06:10 pm UTC (link)
Out of legal curiosity... what is the recourse if the useless GS-15 refuses to overturn the baseless objection? Say the process repeated all the way up to the Director - is there any point at all at which a judicial action can be initiated on an objection?
Would you have to go so far as to petition a federal court for a writ of mandamus against the Director?

-MM

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(Anonymous)
2008-10-26 09:06 am UTC (link)
JPE: a few thoughts from Europe. We in Europe don't experience the difficulties you so helpfully flag up. Here are the reasons why:

1. The intermediary between the inventor and the PTO is NOT an attorney at law. Instead, it is a member of a profession, qualified by public examination in the skills of being a patent attorney. In German patent litigation, it is the patent attorney who plays the leading advocacy role. The attorney at law just does the boring procedural stuff (quantum of damages etc). Thus, inventor, prosecutor and PTO have a common keen technical background and interest in writing sense. Over here, inventors do recognise their inventions in the issued claims.

2. No presumtion of validity, and routine revocation of "indefinite" claims. The maxim "Be careful what you ask for" applies over here. If the Exr spots a flaw, say Thank You to that Exr.

3. Over here we have a simple rule: Words mean what they mean. A cutting means, for example, is "anything under the sun that cuts". This is not rocket science. When it comes to "broadest reasonable interpretation" we are all on the same page, and there is precious little debate what that meaning is. If the claim's too broad, well then, narrow it, by adding the necessary further words.

4. The US Patent Statute is fundamentally illogical, and stuffed full with unnecessary complexity. (Suits all those attorneys at law of course) But it's not in the interest of the US public because it's incomprehensible to anybody except an attorney at law (and not even very many of those).

Why doesn't the incoming President just write a new clear slimmed down Patent Statute. Then being a PTO Exr would once again be fun (as it is in the EPO). And US inventors would get more effective rights.

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(Anonymous)
2008-10-29 12:38 pm UTC (link)
MadMax -- are you bringing your European-elitist garbage over here as well?

"The intermediary between the inventor and the PTO is NOT an attorney at law. Instead, it is a member of a profession, qualified by public examination in the skills of being a patent attorney."

Uh --- wrong. One doesn't practice before the USPTO without being a "member of a profession" (i.e., a person with an engineering degree or similar qualificatiosn) and "qualified by public examination" (i.e., the whole 'patent bar'/'registration number' thing).

"No presumtion of validity, and routine revocation of "indefinite" claims. The maxim "Be careful what you ask for" applies over here. If the Exr spots a flaw, say Thank You to that Exr."
As if US Courts don't find claims invalid due to prior art, indefiniteness, etc.

"Over here we have a simple rule: Words mean what they mean. A cutting means, for example, is 'anything under the sun that cuts'. This is not rocket science. When it comes to 'broadest reasonable interpretation' we are all on the same page, and there is precious little debate what that meaning is. If the claim's too broad, well then, narrow it, by adding the necessary further words."

Oh please -- stop making up stuff. Also, are you really that ignorant about language. Most words can have SEVERAL meanings. Also, certain words have special meanings, to those skilled in the art, that you will not easily find in any dictionary. Also, people use some words incorrectly because they really don't know the true meaning of the word. Anybody, from any country, who can state, with a straight face, that their language is not inherently ambiguous (i.e., "[w]ords mean what they mean" is either grossly ignorant or a liar.

BTW: Translate an application from German to English and French and I'll GUARANTEE that the meaning of certain terms in the specification/claims will be changed.

"The US Patent Statute is fundamentally illogical, and stuffed full with unnecessary complexity. (Suits all those attorneys at law of course) But it's not in the interest of the US public because it's incomprehensible to anybody except an attorney at law (and not even very many of those)."
Do you understand the term "conclusory statement"? Here is a suggestion -- find a dictionary and look up the word 'conclusory.' Please, pray tell, explain WHY the US patent statutes are fundamentally illogical. Also, since the statues are "stuffed with unnecessary complexity," you should be able to identify 20 or more so examples of this unnecessary complexity. Do you have it in you to do so? I didn't think so -- you are all talk and no action.

"Why doesn't the incoming President just write a new clear slimmed down Patent Statute. Then being a PTO Exr would once again be fun (as it is in the EPO). And US inventors would get more effective rights."
I understand you are from Europe, but you are that ignorant about the U.S. system of government?

As for being "fun," what kind of statement is that? Is the patent process a big joke to you, because based upon your comments and plain ignorance of reality, it appears that way.

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(Anonymous)
2008-10-29 03:53 pm UTC (link)
I rest my case on a comparison of like with like: The US Statute with the EPC; the CFR with the EPC Implementing Regulations; the MPEP with the EPO Guidelines for Examination; and the caselaw of the USA with the EPO Caselaw Digest (a pocket book). Fact is, PTO Examiner readers, in each case the European document is multiple times smaller than the US doc. But it still works, as you can see by accessing any EPO app you like, under www.epoline.org. Each European document is no joke, but is fun to read (which I think exposes someone's disingenuous attempt to paint joke and fun as synonyms). "Elitist" you say. How come? I would invite you to look it up? Or is it just a dirty word you get a kick out of repeating? I'm not an Examiner, and I take it you aren't either. I'm not an attorney at law, but I bet you are.

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(Anonymous)
2008-11-03 10:26 pm UTC (link)
I'm not the guy you were replying to, but I'd have to say that what you "rest your case on" isn't very solid. All you've presented is that the EPO manuals are slimmer than the US ones. There's a mighty big non sequitur to leap across between "slimmer" and "better."

-MM

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(Anonymous)
2008-11-06 07:24 am UTC (link)
I didn't say "better". But patentability in Europe goes like this:

101: Does your claim have "technical character". Abstract mathematics and business methods don't.

102: 1)Does your claim embrace anything already "made available" to any member of "the public" before you filed and 2) did somebody else get to the Patent Office before you did.

103: On your filing date, for a PHOSITA deemed to be pursuing a specific technical purpose, was the subject matter of your claim the solution to an "objective technical problem"

112: Is the claim clear, and does your specification enable it.

I explain all that to lay clients. They immediately understand. Builds confidence in the system, I find.

(Reply to this) (Parent)

EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-04 06:35 pm UTC (link)
I submit that a primary reason that we have more case law is that there is value in fighting for, obtaining and enforcing US patents in a way that there is not in Europe. I'll also submit that the length of a document (e.g., CFR vs. EPC) in no way proves its inherent simplicity or value. Compare, for example, the US Constitution (short, complex, of great value in helping to create one of the most free and powerful nations on Earth) to the Spanish Constitution (longer, at least as complex, and in setting forth so many specifics, fails to protect the citizens as well as the US ver.). Other examples are left to the reader.
A common law system lends itself to more case law and a greater requirement to interpret that case law (ergo, long MPEP) than does a civil system. That does not necessarily make one better than the other, though I personally prefer common law to civil for its flexibility given the fact that it's rarely possible to know in advance what all the possibilities are.

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-06 09:59 am UTC (link)
"More case law"? Well, the EPO's Boards of Appeal have issued thousands of decisions on patentability in the last 30 years, and all are unappealable any higher. That's a pretty substantial body of top level caselaw. And precisely because there is no Binding Precedent, it is more evolutionary and more flexible and more future-compatible than CAFC law. Did Bilski clarify anything? Is EPO caselaw on computer-implemented inventions by now settled (most think it is, and that the President's referral will serve to confirm that fact)? I would challenge my tormenters with their own words: as it is undisputed that European law on patentability is more compact and simple than that of the USA, and as EPO jurisprudence is more flexible and yields greater legal certainty, where's the defect that renders European brevity sub-standard? So far, the only retort I get is "Patent law is inherently complex. If European law is as simple as you make out, it is too simple to do justice" My contention is simply that patent law is inherently simple. When I write that words mean what they say, I had in mind that, with 35 USC 112, an expression like cutting means means a mysterious sub-set of cutting means, it means one thing in the PTO and a different thing to the Markman judge, and that we will have to wait for the CAFC before we know exactly which sub-set. In Europe, by contrast, where we don't have 35 USC 112 in our Statute, "cutting means" means in every European language, in every Patent Office and in every Gourt, the same thing (and in a rare case when an English word doesn't mean the same thing in French or German or Spanish, well then the multi-lingual 3 member EPO examining division will see that the meaning is clarified, before the claim gets issued).

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-06 04:18 pm UTC (link)
"the EPO's Boards of Appeal have issued thousands of decisions on patentability in the last 30 years, and all are unappealable any higher. That's a pretty substantial body of top level caselaw. And precisely because there is no Binding Precedent, it is more evolutionary and more flexible and more future-compatible than CAFC law."

Apparently, you don't understand the relationship between "case law" and binding precedent. Your "thousands of decisions on patentability" are USELESS if there is no binding precedent.

In the US, if your fact pattern closely mirrors the fact pattern in a Federal Circuit decision, you should expect the decision in your application to also mirror that made by the Federal Circuit. This is what "binding precedent" is all about.

However, if your explanation about the EPO is to be believed. If a first case was decided yesterday on one set of facts and if a case (with a very similar set of facts) were to be decided tomorrow, the second case could come out differetly than the first case. How does that provide for more legal certainty?

"EPO jurisprudence is more flexible and yields greater legal certainty"
Only a legal-ignoramous would write such a statement.

The purpose of "case law" and "binding precedent" is to provide predictability. The direct result of the decision (i.e., somebody wins or loses) has less impact than other parties' ability to rely upon the law embodied by that decision. More flexibility = greater uncertainty.

BTW: Your use of the phrase "cutting means" is amusing. Let's see ... example of cutting means: a razor blade, a propeller (i.e., cuts through the wind), a device that shuffles playing cards, a software-implemented editor ... to name just a few.

So, pray tell, which "same thing" of these multitude of English-language meanings does a cutting means refer to in the EPO?

Really, are you that ignorant as to the flexibility of language?

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-06 05:29 pm UTC (link)
Isn't there a book called something like "The Wisdom of Crowds" in which the crowd gets the answer (What was it, the weight of a prize bull or something) closer to the truth than any one member of the crowd on his/her lottery ticket. In the EPO, it's not a prize bull but the meaning of "technical" or "public". I know about common law Binding Precedent and I know about the evolution of legal certainty in the world's other (and default) legal system commonly called "civil law". I'm not an ignoramus. In my long experience, those quickest to dismiss others as an ignoramus have a self-esteem problem. How much has the Binding CAFC added to legal certainty with its Bilski en banc Decision? The USPTO gives a broadest reasonable meaning to terms in claims (I understand). Are you not aware of the English Supreme Court view, that, shorn of context, no word means anything at all. But, in context, we can put a meaning on "cutting means" and the French and the Germans will concur. Clear now?

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-07 12:49 am UTC (link)
It seems to me that you are sounding more and more like the Federal Circuit (FC), particularly in their Bilski decision.

Essentially, like the FC, you are making a result-generated arguments instead of law-generated arguments. This is what happens when you try defend an indefensible position while using the law. You end up sounding like a fool and create some truly awful statements of the law.

BTW: You still have given me the EPO's single definition of cutting means.

BTW: Your "shorn of context" statement shows that there is some hope for you yet. However, the problem occurs that the context at the USPTO/FC/etc. isn't always the same.

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-07 07:11 am UTC (link)
Your opinion that there is still some hope for me is a great comfort to me, thanks, at this time when so much hope is in the air. In calendar year 2007 a total of 1371 (unappealable)Decisions of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO were added to its database. On the one hand, that's too many for any one person to study intimately. On the other hand, there is my "Wisdom of Crowds" point. That many decisions, year on year for 30 years, gives us in Europe a very fair idea what the law is, on novelty, obviousness, enablement, entitlement to priority, allowability of prosecution amendments, etc. Note how, 20 years ago, the national courts in Europe gave the EPO no deference but now, after a further 20 years of EPO law-making, they do. The EPO, gradually, is supplanting the jurisprudence of the national supreme courts of the EPC countries with its own jurisprudence, thanks to the Wisdom of Crowds.

Anyway, that's how it's done in a civil law jurisdiction. You should try it sometime. You might learn something. What both common and civil law systems have in common is the Rader philosophy, namely, start from the words of the Statute. I have no idea what this dichotomy is that you burble about, results-based as opposed to law-based. I'm not used to being told I sound like an awful fool. The other readers should form their own views, right?

Finally, you bamboozle me completely, on "cutting means". On the one hand, you compliment me on my point that "shorn of context any word is meaningless" then call upon me to deliver the one unique, EPO-defined meaning of "cutting means". Not much "context" there, I should have thought. Care to clarify?

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-07 05:46 pm UTC (link)
"many decisions, year on year for 30 years, gives us in Europe a very fair idea what the law is"

Fair idea???? What kind of predictability does that provide?

"thanks to the Wisdom of Crowds"
The wisdom of the crowds doesn't help an applicant stuck with the village idiot who drafts an "unappealable" decision.

"I have no idea what this dichotomy is that you burble about, results-based as opposed to law-based."
Unfortunately, many decisions (by judges, juries, at the USPTO, and I'm sure also at the EPO) are result-based. To be "result-based" means that the result is predetermined before the law is applied to the facts – this is just human nature (i.e., a "gut feel" about right/wrong, guilt/innocence, patentable/unpatentable). The problem with result-based decisions is that they may be contrary to a decision that is based solely upon application of the law to the facts regardless of any preconceived notions of right/wrong, guilt/innocence, patentable/unpatentable. When you have this difference, particularly when the decision is made by a judge, the judge creates "case law" that attempts to distinguish why the judge reached the particular decision despite prior case law calling for a different decision. This "new" case law subsequently screws things up for subsequently decisions.

"then call upon me to deliver the one unique, EPO-defined meaning of 'cutting means'."
You are the one that trotted out "cutting means" as an example of a term that has some universal meaning throughout the EPO. The fact that you refuse to provide this universal meaning is an indication that there is no universal meaning.

BTW: you cannot have it both ways -- you cannot say that "cutting means" means the same throughout the EPO and then hide behind the not having enough context to provide a definition.

Without realizing it, you proved my own point. When an examiner attempts to determine whether or not a claimed "cutting mean" is taught by reference A, the "context" is the language of the claims, the applicant's specification and reference A. When reference B is reviewed, the context also changes. Also when a judge, e.g., in a Markman hearing, is presented with different evidence as to the meaning of "cutting means," the "context" yet again changes. Start introducing different languages and imperfect translations and the "context" is again changed.

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-07 11:27 pm UTC (link)
Yawn. Just two things before I go. A Board of Appeal at the EPO is composed of at least two experts in the technical field in question plus a legal expert. No dissent judgements allowed. I take exception to characterizing that tribunal as "the village idiot" but, from you, such casual ignorant insults are not a surprise. Judge on results. Please to give me some examples of the idiot decisions you assert are out there. The meaning of a word used in a document is the meaning in the context of that document. The English rule for claim interpretation is: What would the PHOSITA have understood that the inventor was using the language of the claim to mean. So, if the claim recites "cutting means" and the context is climbing ropes then "cutting means" would be something that a PHOSITA understands to cut a climbing rope. What's in other documents about cutting means is irrelevant. And, at that point, I'm cutting out of here.

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-08 03:08 pm UTC (link)
"A Board of Appeal at the EPO is composed of at least two experts in the technical field in question plus a legal expert. No dissent judgements allowed. I take exception to characterizing that tribunal as 'the village idiot' but, from you, such casual ignorant insults are not a surprise. Judge on results. Please to give me some examples of the idiot decisions you assert are out there."

For one, you've already admitted that there must be "idiot decisions." You said that one will get a "fair idea." This means that not all the decisions agree -- otherwise, after a single decision, one would get a "perfect idea" as to the meaning of a term. Also, relying upon your "wisdom of the crowd" example, everybody in the crowd doesn't have the same answer. As such, some must be wrong (i.e., the village idiot) whereas others are right.

As for the alleged "two experts in the technical field," unlike in Europe, we (in the US) have a healthy distrust of so-called government "experts." Given the extremely wide range of technologies out there, I find it very difficult to believe that the EPO is able to find two experts on any given technology for all applications.

"The English rule for claim interpretation is: What would the PHOSITA have understood that the inventor was using the language of the claim to mean."
Pretty much like US law.

What I find VERY FUNNY is your final statement that:

"So, if the claim recites 'cutting means' and the context is climbing ropes then 'utting means'would be something that a PHOSITA understands to cut a climbing rope."

In contrast, this is what you wrote in your original post:
"Words mean what they mean. A cutting means, for example, is 'anything under the sun that cuts'."

The problem with being a mad-man is that logic and consistentcy doesn't play a big role in your analysis. If it did, you wouldn't be caught with your pants down making COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT statements. This is why nobody ever takes you seriously. You'll write anything to make your point (which is always the same -- EPO patent law is great and US patent law is terrible), and when I say you write anything, it means that your writings have a healthy disregard for the facts, the law, and consistency. Attorneys at law are trained to identify when these occur, which is why you have had (over the past couple of years) very little traction in convincing anybody in the US that the EPO system is better.

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-08 06:00 pm UTC (link)
Well, no traction with YOU that's for sure, but then, I'm banking on others reading this thread and not just you. To answer your points:

It's anything under the sun that.....in context..wait for it....cuts. Here, the context is climbing ropes. Not everything that cuts, say, soft butter, will also cut a climbing rope. Climbers do rather depend on not everything under the sun having the capability to cut their ropes. But, if the context is..wait for it..soft butter....well then a greater range of things under the hot sun might have te capability to cut it.

Claim construction in England is NOT like US law. Are you a US patent attorney? Where you are (if I understand it right, but you'll correct me if I'm wrong) you start from what the words of the claim literally mean to the PHOSITA. Not the same thing at all. I cite the Chef America case. "Heat the dough in the oven to 400 degrees F" Crystal clear meaning, that the dough temperature must be 400° ie dough =charcoal. In England, the Phosita would gather that the writer was using the language of the claim to mean "set the oven temp to 400°" Dough = bread.

As to the wisdom of crowds, just ask any major US corporation (like J&J or P&G) for their experiences before Boards of Appeal of the EPO, whether as patent owner or opponent. Ask them if the Boards are peopled by village idiots.

And even if they are, for every near idiot who says the pig weighs 10 oz there will be another who says its 10 ton, so their aberrant decisions cancel each other out, leaving an average which is spot on. Anyway, in any one 5000 inhabitant village, there's usually only one inhabitant that attracts the appellation "village" idiot, right?

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Re: EPO case law
(Anonymous)
2008-11-09 09:38 pm UTC (link)
......as the patent lawyer from the USA said to another European troublemaker from long ago, Charles Darwin: "Hey Charlie, you know, it's a load of old bollocks, all that civil law, 1371 decisions per year, "survival of the fittest" legal logic. Truth be told, all those EPO "technical judges" competing with each other, week after week, to identify and use, in their unrolling carpet of decisions, the "fittest" line of logic, that will be the most robust against highly intelligent and focussed criticism, are in fact village idiots. In the common law USA we worship the intelligent design of SCOTUS. You only have to compare the results to see which system works better"

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abstract function and no structure
(Anonymous)
2008-11-07 04:35 am UTC (link)
I concur with the authors that the claim language for software applications are generally written in an abstract descriptive style that describes the functional behavior of the software program, but usually claims very few structural limitations.

For example, the claim language of "a computer program for allowing a user to delete a file; wherein the user can target the file to be deleted, and perform a delete action" indicates a function of the software program, but claims no structural limitations.

I guess a structural limitation would really narrow the claim, because for example, in the example above, there could be a lot of different ways to "delete a file" through a structural means (e.g., by clicking a button, by selecting a menu option, by moving it to a trashcan icon, by pressing 'delete' on the keyboard, etc.).

Generally, the claim language starts out as broad abstract descriptions of what the invention can do, and each office action rejection forces the attorney to add a little structure to the claim language.

The "problem" for attorneys in the software arts is that it is easy to write a computer program to perform the same function as another computer program through a slightly different structural means, and thus not infringe the invention.

If claim language does become allowable, then you will see that it is a certain % abstract description, and a lesser % structural limitations.

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Re: abstract function and no structure
(Anonymous)
2008-11-07 05:53 pm UTC (link)
What is wrong with functional limitations defining structure? This is what the 6th paragraph of 35 USC 112 is all about. See also http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2173_05_g.htm

Consider the following words: radiator (a device that radiates); light (a device that produces light); computer (a device that computes); connector (a device that produces a connection). One would be able to recognize the structure could be associated with these terms, but in essence, these terms are defined by what the device does rather than what it is.

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Re: abstract function and no structure
(Anonymous)
2008-11-08 12:39 am UTC (link)
I don't think there there is anything wrong with purely abstract functional claims.

In your words, "the terms are defined by what the device does", so what kind of software structure is defined by the words "a computer program for deleting a file"?

Abstract functional limitations don't define structure. "A computer program for performing function X" is purely abstract and defines no structure.

There are an infinite number of structural ways that "a computer can delete a file" (e.g., a user clicks "delete" button on screen, user selects menu on tab, user double-clicks file). There are endless scenarios of a user interacting with the software structure to perform a delete action.

The reason the software structure is important is because it is likely the innovative aspect of the invention. There are a lot of known ways of "deleting a file", but how does this new invention differ structurally from all the known ways.

I don't think I have ever seen a purely abstract novel claim, but I think it is very possible if one were to put enough abstractions together in the claim. It would read like, "a computer program for performing function X, function Y, function Z".

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Re: abstract function and no structure
(Anonymous)
2008-11-08 02:50 pm UTC (link)
"The reason the software structure is important is because it is likely the innovative aspect of the invention. There are a lot of known ways of 'deleting a file', but how does this new invention differ structurally from all the known ways."

I think you presume too much. Claims to software aren't usually directed to how a particular function is being performed. Instead, software claims are directed to the combination (i.e., "as a whole") of the functions being performed.

As you stated, there are dozens of knows ways of deleting a file, so if the invention includes "deleting a file" and if it is not important how the file is deleted, then the language of "deleting a file" should be perfectly ok. You should take a look at this MPEP section: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2173_04.htm The title of it says it all: "Breadth Is Not Indefiniteness"

"I don't think I have ever seen a purely abstract novel claim, but I think it is very possible if one were to put enough abstractions together in the claim. It would read like, 'a computer program for performing function X, function Y, function Z'."
The reason why you wouldn't see a claim like that is because (i) nobody claims a computer program, per se and (ii) reciting three (or more or less) independent functions. It would be comparable to reciting "a car comprising means for steering, means for muffling, and means for radiating." All these elements are in the prior art so unless one recites some distinguishing feature, then the claim will fail -- software-related claims aren't the only example in which such a situation occurs.

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