just_n_examiner ([info]just_n_examiner) wrote,
@ 2007-04-30 22:52:00
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A Supreme Court Smackdown
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

Well, the decision finally came down.

I'm not really a student of Supreme Court decisions [yet]. However, work as an examiner and you can't help but become one eventually.

Nevertheless, from my (uneducated) standpoint, this opinion seems to be more, well, 'severe', than I expected.

Some of the interesting language:

"[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed invention does.
...
Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and when it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents."


OUCH! [Did they say 'common sense'? Hmm. Haven't seen those words used in any Office actions in a while.]

"The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was to [hold] that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve.
...
Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed."


"The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem.
...
Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle."


There's that mention of common sense again...

"The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was "obvious to try".
...the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103."


It might show that it was obvious? Gee, thanks...

"The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias.
...
Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense...are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with with it."


There's that reference to common sense again.


So what will this do to the obviousness analysis as applied by examiners? I don't think anyone really knows that at this point, but I'm sure there are lots of practitioners out there who are convinced that the sky is falling.

It seems as if the Court has said a whole lot about what analysis should not be applied when considering obviousness, but not so much about what (specific) analysis should be applied (other than the fact that every instance of potential obviousness needs to be analyzed based on the circumstances and merits specific to the individual case). Once again, thanks a lot.

It would be nice if there were a concise, predictable bright-line test that could be applied to all obviousness analyses. The CAFC took their best shot with the TSM test, but it didn't work. The Supreme Court said so:

"There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis. But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs."

Back to the drawing board.


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[info]dixiediva82
2007-05-01 11:47 am UTC (link)
I always want to argue that a combination would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art because of common sense but usually have to dig really hard to find motivation written clear as day. Sometimes, depending on the case, I'm able to argue that I provided a basis for the motivation to combine "in fact and/or technical reasoning", which is just basically a fancy of way of telling the applicant that common sense to one having ordinary skill in the art would have led one to combine.

Whatever comes of this, I have a feeling that it may make it easier for an Examiner to make a 103, while making it harder for the Applicant to argue.

P.S. There is an article in the WPost today about this.

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-01 02:37 pm UTC (link)
I'm not aware of any examiner who thinks this is a huge victory. I've only skimmed the decision so far and it appears to me that the decision has only made things more murky. From my point of view as an examiner, murky usually means that the job is going to be more difficult rather than easier.

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Urban legend
(Anonymous)
2007-05-01 04:11 pm UTC (link)
Of --As the commissioner of the PTO in the late 19th century said, everything that could be invented has already been invented--, there is no such quote.

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-03 02:13 am UTC (link)
Saw a bunch of "sky is falling" type posts from attorneys.

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-02 01:16 am UTC (link)
The following quote includes text in the KSR opinion that immediately precedes the "interrelated teachings" quote. A patent to Asano taught everything contained in the claim except the use of a sensor to detect the pedal's position and transmit it to the computer controlling the throttle. In the industry, sensors had been increasingly used in used in other pedals. The first portion of the quote explains some principles as to why adding a sensor to the claimed pedal was predicatable variation. In a case like KSR, formulating a rejection would seem to be straight forward. The second part of the quote says that this could be difficult if the case is not as simple as adding a sensor to a pedal.

"When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, §103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill . . . Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it is here because the claimed subject matter may involve more than the simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement. Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings . . ."

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-03 11:59 pm UTC (link)
I don't agree with "That quote is nothing more than the Supremes telling everybody that the art that is used has to be analogous." The quote is from part II A of the decision. In the second paragraph in II A, the Court quotes the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea case: "Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements. … A patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions . . . withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men." The Court goes on to say "the combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results."

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-05 01:40 am UTC (link)
> I realize the PTO would love to view the KSR decision as carte blanche to combine any group of references together, no matter how disparate their scope and content ...

It's hard to take people who write crap like this seriously. Have you read the memo the Office put out in response to KSR?

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-08 03:24 pm UTC (link)
John,

I am the one who wrote: I don't agree with "That quote is nothing more than the Supremes telling everybody that the art that is used has to be analogous." For the record, I do agree with the first three paragraphs of this subsequent post. As to the PTO wanting to view the decision in a certain way, I don't know. By the PTO, do we mean management, the collective view of all examiners, or a particular group of individuals? I'm not looking for an answer. My point is that it is not that simple to say what the PTO may or may not want. And for this reason, I don't offer an opinion as to the thought in your final paragraph.

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-08 03:39 pm UTC (link)
John,

Actually, I don't agree with your statement: "J. Kennedy (or most likely his law clerk(s)) didn't bother to read 103(a)."

It may be true that the decision "does not say that just because you have all the elements and they would function as expected, that the claim is obvious over the combined references." But the decision does say "the combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield pre-
dictable results." This is the principal of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. case. I agree that "likely to be obvious" does not meant the same thing as "is obvious." So you are correct. But by citing Great Atlantic Tea, Kennedy is not merely saying be careful to only consider analgous art. He is saying that the principle of Great Atlantic Tea needs to be applied where appropriate.

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Interim guidelines?
(Anonymous)
2007-05-01 02:08 pm UTC (link)
JPE -- good post as always.

How soon will the USPTO release interim guidelines that explain how examiners should apply KSR?

Like johndarling above, I'm not overly concerned about the actual holding of KSR.

However, knowing the legal aptitude of the patent policy wonks at the PTO (see the interim 101 guidelines), I'm concerned about how they will apply KSR in the absence of any Federal Circuit guidance (which is likely several years off).

For example, I wouldn’t be surprised if the interim 103 guidelines instructed examiners to:

(1) identify all elements of a clam in one or more prior art references (through keyword EAST searches);

(2) recite that the examiner a person skilled in the art;

(3) determine if the claimed invention is extraordinary based on the examiner’s common sense opinion; and

(4) if the invention is merely ordinary based on the examiner’s common sense opinion, the examiner should reject the claim as obvious under 103.

Include new form paragraph in the OA:

The results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S.__, ___ (2007). The inventions recited in all pending claims have been determined to be ordinary by one skilled in the art as they are merely a combination of known elements.

I’ve written a PERL script to (1) through (4) above—-it will save everyone a lot of time. I’d try to patent the script if it wasn’t an obvious solution to a known problem.

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Re: Interim guidelines?
(Anonymous)
2007-05-01 03:33 pm UTC (link)
I don't think we'll have to wait a couple of years before the CAFC issues their first opinion based on the new guidance. The Supremes ruling takes effect NOW, so any cases in the pipeline that haven't actually issued, even if they've been argued, will have to conform. I predict we'll see something within a couple of months at the latest.

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[info]roh_wyn
2007-05-01 03:59 pm UTC (link)
My colleagues and I have been discussing the effect of KSR on examination of patents.

One thing that immediately occurred to all of us was that whatever standard the Court has articulated, it seems to shift the burden of making a prima facie case of obviousness from the examiner to the applicant. That is, based on the existence of elements in the prior art and "common sense", the examiner can essentially reject every invention as obvious, unless the patent applicant can provide evidence to the contrary.

Most litigators are lauding the decision, because it gives them a chance to "build a story" at trial, but the lack of a bright line, definitive standard really ties the PTO's arms, IMO.

I'd be curious to know if the Office is announcing new obviousness guidelines in view of the decision. Any idea?

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-02 05:09 am UTC (link)
I don't think the ruling applies to all 103 rejections. Just those based upon a combination of known elements performing known functions. Specifically where the sum of those elements performs only the function of the sum of the parts. Elements that combine to perform a greater function, are not available to combine as previously taught, or lead to some unexpected result will still require a greater burden to reject under 103.

If that is the case, I don't have any problem with this burden shifting. I see nothing inherently wrong with requiring greater proof from the applicant that his invention deserves a limited monopoly when the sole uniqueness is drawn from a combination of old material.

Examiners will still be required to find each and every element of the claims in a combination of references. These elements will still need to be capable of combining, and when they need to be altered, some analysis will need to be provided to explain the modification.

I also think this finally opens the door to "common sense" rationalizations. Often examiners are left to resort to convoluted motivations as they are all that is disclosed in the prior art when simpler and more obvious motivations are warranted. This should encourage better "story telling" on the part of examiners as well.
-M

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-03 01:23 am UTC (link)
God, I hope so. I can't begin to tell you how many times the essence of the examiner's motivation to combine references is "to make it better."

In a way, the decision will make it easier for us attorneys to know when to amend the claims to make them tighter. After Festo, we are very reluctant to make any amendments because of giving away reasonable equivalents when looking at infringement. So, we have been pressing the "no motivation to combine" as hard as we can. I betcha that examiners who have been around awhile have noticed that the "no motivation to combine" arguments increased after Festo. I know they certainly have in my practice.

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why not allow the claims
(Anonymous)
2007-05-03 03:02 am UTC (link)
"Often examiners are left to resort to convoluted motivations ..."

Why not just allow the claims?

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Re: why not allow the claims
(Anonymous)
2007-05-04 01:49 am UTC (link)
> Why not just allow the claims?

Because common sense would have lead one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references. Duh.

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Re: why not allow the claims
(Anonymous)
2007-05-04 03:28 am UTC (link)
Allowing a claim or not is ultimately the call of someone with sig authority. What do you do when you've done the best search you can but still can't find a limitation or if you've found all the limitations in prior arts, but you lack a good reason to combine and the primary in your art unit doesn't want to allow?

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Re: why not allow the claims
(Anonymous)
2007-05-04 04:43 pm UTC (link)
this is when you resign...

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Re: why not allow the claims
(Anonymous)
2007-05-08 01:59 am UTC (link)
so 90% of the examining corps should resign then...

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Re: why not allow the claims
(Anonymous)
2007-05-07 01:50 pm UTC (link)
Why not just allow the claims?

Because the Directors and Supervisors are trying to minimize quality errors (patentability determination) so they can get their monetary bonus's. They dont care that the appplication is allowable. They only care that less issues = more money in their pocket.

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Measurement of quality errors
(Anonymous)
2007-05-07 08:23 pm UTC (link)
"Because the Directors and Supervisors are trying to minimize quality errors"

Can you elaborate on how "quality errors" are measured? Is there a written procedure?

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Beverly Hillbilly Redux
(Anonymous)
2007-05-02 01:02 am UTC (link)
I'm going to start my arguments with the story of Jed Clampet (with the inventor's name, of course). Maybe I'll throw in: "He was so dumbfounded by his discovery, he leapt to his feet and ran naked around the lab yelling, 'Oh my god, oh my god, oh my god!'" And work in: "This invention is so innovative! It's gold, GOLD! Maybe I'll entertain the examiner during an interview with a song and dance.

This actually may make the profession more fun.

JohnG

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Interim proceedures
(Anonymous)
2007-05-02 03:00 am UTC (link)
There are significant differences between KSR and the teachings of the MPEP regarding obviousness. What are the patent office proceedures for the interim period before the MPEP is updated? Is it up to each SPE to set guidelines for the junior examiners that report to them?

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Business As Usual
(Anonymous)
2007-05-03 02:32 pm UTC (link)
While it's nice to have the Supreme Court's stamp on this line of reasoning, I don't envision any major changes to how examiners in my area - business methods - do our jobs.

We've been relying on In re Khan(CAFC, 04-1616, 3/22/2006)for quite awhile now that has similar language.

“[a] suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the relevant prior art teachings does not have to be found explicitly in the prior art, as the teaching, motivation, or suggestion may be implicit from the prior art as a whole, rather than expressly stated in the references...The test for an implicit showing is what the combined teachings, knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and the nature of the problem to be solved as a whole would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art… there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 78 USPQ2d 1329, 1336 (CAFC 2006).

JB

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(Anonymous)
2007-05-03 07:17 pm UTC (link)
PTO has issued a memo regarding interim practice in view of the KSR decision. I am not sure if it's confidential, so I won't post it in entirety. But essentially, we are still to provide a "reason" why a PHOSITA would combine the references. So for you practioners, the sky ain't falling, yet.

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